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Abstract 
 
This article provides a statistical analysis of the core contentions of the 'varieties of 
capitalism' perspective on comparative capitalism.  We construct indices to assess 
whether patterns of coordination in the OECD economies conform to the predictions of 
the theory and compare the correspondence of institutions across sub-spheres of the 
political economy.  We test the contention that institutional complementarities can occur 
across these sub-spheres by estimating the impact of complementarities in labor relations 
and corporate governance on rates of growth. To assess the durability of varieties of 
capitalism, we report the extent of institutional change in the 1980s and 1990s.  The 
evidence suggests powerful interaction effects across institutions in the sub-spheres of 
the political economy that must be considered if efforts to assess the economic impact of 
institutional reform in any one sphere are to be accurate. 
 
 
  1  Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An 
Empirical Analysis 
Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich* 
 
The field of comparative political economy has been interested for many years in understanding 
how differences in the organization of national political economies condition aggregate economic 
performance.  Behind such inquiries lies the intuition that more than one economic model can 
deliver economic success.  But what are the central features that distinguish the operation of one 
political economy from another, and how should countries be categorized along these dimensions 
of difference? 
For the developed economies, the answers usually given to these questions in each era 
have corresponded to the principal challenges confronting those economies.  During the 1960s, 
when economic modernization was high on the agenda, efforts to identify distinctive types of 
capitalism emphasized variation in the character of state intervention into the economy.
1 When 
inflation rose to new heights during the 1970s, the emphasis shifted to the contributions of neo-
corporatism to wage and price moderation.
2 In recent years, scholars have been seeking 
approaches salient to an era of globalization.
3  
The object of this analysis is to subject one of the most prominent of these new 
approaches to a set of empirical tests.  We focus on the ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective 
introduced in a volume edited by Hall and Soskice and now widely referenced in the literature.
4  
Applying the new economics of organization to the macroeconomy, this approach distinguishes 
among capitalist economies by reference to the ways firms and other actors coordinate their 
endeavours. It suggests that nations cluster into identifiable groups based on the extent to which 
firms rely on market or strategic modes of coordination.  From these formulations follow many 
  2  important contentions about variations in economic performance, comparative institutional 
advantage, national responses to globalization, and comparative public policy. 
The varieties of capitalism approach is grounded in a rich set of comparative case-studies, 
but efforts to assess it using statistical analysis on larger numbers of cases are still at an early 
stage.
5  Those efforts have been limited partly because we do not yet have good measures for the 
character of coordination, the concept at the heart of the analysis.  As a result, the position of 
many countries within those categories remains ambiguous.  We seek indicators for coordination 
that will allow us to test some basic tenets of this approach and that others can use for subsequent 
assessments. 
We are especially interested in one of the core contentions of the varieties of capitalism 
approach, namely, its theory of institutional complementarities in the macroeconomy.   
One set of institutions is said to be complementary to another when its presence raises the returns 
available from the other.  Economists have identified such complementarities at the level of the 
firm, where marketing strategies based on customized products, for instance, may be 
complementary to computer-controlled production processes.
6 However, Hall and Soskice argue 
that complementarities, with positive effects on aggregate economic performance, are embedded 
in institutions across sub-spheres of the political economy.
7  This is an important contention.  If 
correct, it implies that efforts to reform one sphere of the political economy may yield negative 
economic results if unaccompanied by parallel reforms in other spheres.  It predicts a particular 
politics of institutional defence. 
By subjecting that contention to empirical assessment, we bring together issues typically 
treated by quite separate literatures.  One considers the impact of institutional reform in labour 
markets, while another considers reform in corporate governance.
8  However, there is growing 
evidence of interactions across some spheres of the political economy.
9  We ask whether the 
  3  interaction effects postulated by the varieties of capitalism approach can be found across the 
spheres of labour relations and corporate governance. 
We begin by developing indices to measure the character of coordination in labour 
relations and corporate governance.  We then use these measures to assess the plausibility of the 
logic used by varieties of capitalism analysts to differentiate among developed political 
economies and the appropriateness of its categories. Turning to the theory’s core postulates about 
the presence of institutional complementarities in the macroeconomy, we ask whether the 
institutional arrangements it sees as complementary actually yield higher rates of economic 
growth. Finally, we inquire into the durability of the categories generated by the varieties of 
capitalism literature, by examining patterns of institutional change over the past two decades. 
Before taking up its core propositions, however, we open with an overview of the varieties-of-
capitalism perspective.
 10 
 
1. The Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
In contrast to the literature focused on national labour movements, varieties-of- capitalism 
analyses assume that firms are the central actors in the economy whose behaviour aggregates into 
national economic performance.  In order to prosper, firms must engage with other actors in 
multiple spheres of the political economy: to raise finance (on financial markets), to regulate 
wages and working conditions (industrial relations), to ensure workers have the requisite skills 
(education and training), to secure access to inputs and technology (via inter-firm relations), to 
compete for customers (in product markets), and to secure the cooperation of their workforce 
(firm-employee relations).  Adopting a relational view of the firm, this perspective assumes that 
success in each of these endeavours depends on efficient coordination with other actors. The 
central problems facing firms are, therefore, coordination problems. 
  4    The varieties of capitalism approach draws a distinction between two modes of 
coordination.  In one, firms coordinate with other actors primarily through competitive markets, 
characterized by arms-length relations and formal contracting.  Here, equilibrium outcomes are 
dictated primarily by relative prices, market signals, and familiar marginalist considerations.   In 
the second, firms coordinate with other actors through processes of strategic interaction of the 
kind typically modeled by game theory.  Here, equilibrium outcomes depend on the institutional 
support available for the formation of credible commitments, including support for effective 
information sharing, monitoring, sanctioning, and deliberation.
11 
  Although instances of market and strategic coordination occur in all capitalist economies, 
this approach contends that, in the spheres central to firm endeavour, the balance between these 
two types of coordination varies across political economies.  At one end of the spectrum stand 
liberal market economies (LMEs) where relations between firms and other actors are coordinated 
primarily by competitive markets.  At the other end are coordinated market economies (CMEs) 
where firms typically engage in more strategic interaction with trade unions, suppliers of finance, 
and other actors.
12 
  Whether a firm coordinates its endeavours through market relations or strategic 
interaction is said to depend on the institutional setting.  Where markets are imperfect and there is 
substantial institutional support for the formation of credible commitments, firms can be expected 
to rely more extensively on strategic coordination.  Where markets are fluid and there is little 
support for such commitments, firms will rely more heavily on market coordination.  Accordingly 
there should be a correspondence between the institutional configuration of each sphere of the 
economy and the character of coordination there.
13 
The distinction will be clearer if we describe a liberal and coordinated market economy.  
Market coordination is a familiar concept in neo-classical economics, and the United States is a 
typical liberal market economy.  Here, firms face large equity markets marked by high levels of 
  5  transparency and dispersed shareholding, where firms' access to external finance depends heavily 
on publicly assessable criteria such as market valuation.  Regulatory regimes allow hostile 
takeovers that depend on share price, rendering managers sensitive to current profitability.  
Because trade unions are relatively weak and employment protection low, labour markets are 
fluid and wage setting primarily a matter of contract between workers and individual employers.  
Because labour markets are fluid, workers have incentives to invest in general skills that can be 
taken to other jobs, and, because industry associations are weak, firms lack the capacity to mount 
the collaborative training programs that confer industry-specific skills. Technology transfer is 
accomplished primarily by licensing or taking on expert personnel, and standards are usually set 
by market races. Top managers enjoy substantial authority over all aspects of firm strategy, 
including lay-offs.  In such settings, many of the relationships firms form with other actors are 
mediated by competitive markets.  Although there are variations among them, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are also generally identified as liberal 
market economies. 
  Germany provides a good example of a coordinated market economy. Its firms are 
closely connected by dense networks of cross-shareholding and influential employers 
associations.  These networks provide for exchanges of private information, allowing firms to 
develop reputations that permit some access to capital on terms that depend more heavily on 
reputation than share value.  Accordingly, managers are less sensitive to current profitability.  In 
the presence of strong trade unions, powerful works councils, and high levels of employment 
protection, labour markets are less fluid and job tenures longer.  In most industries, wage setting 
is coordinated by trade unions and employers associations that also supervise collaborative 
training schemes, providing workers with industry-specific skills and assurances of positions if 
they invest in them.  Industry associations play a major role in standard setting, and substantial 
amounts of technology transfer take place through inter-firm collaboration.  Hemmed in by 
  6  powerful workforce representatives and business networks, top managers have less scope for 
unilateral action, and firms typically adhere to more consensual styles of decision-making.  It 
should be apparent that, in order to perform their core functions, firms in coordinated market 
economies like that of Germany must engage in strategic interaction in multiple spheres, although 
the institutions on which they rely and the quality of the outcomes may vary from one country to 
another. Austria, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland are usually identified as coordinated market economies. 
 
2. Establishing Coordination as a Crucial Dimension 
We begin our analysis by examining the core contention of the varieties of capitalism approach 
that the developed economies differ from one another according to the extent to which firms 
depend on market or strategic coordination to accomplish their endeavours.  Of course, the 
character of coordination is difficult to measure directly.  However, as Hall and Soskice point out, 
the nature of coordination depends on the type of institutions available to support it.  
Accordingly, a factor analysis designed to identify commonalities that may be unobservable in 
themselves but that correlate with a range of observable variables provides an appropriate 
technique for identifying the character of coordination.
14 By performing a factor analysis on a set 
of institutional measures that are commonly associated with one type of coordination or another, 
we can assess whether the dimensions of market and strategic coordination posited by varieties of 
capitalism theory exist and where they are present. Varieties of capitalism theory generates three 
hypotheses that can be tested using such an analysis: 
 
 
 
  7  H1: The character of coordination constitutes a key dimension stretching across spheres of the 
political economy. 
 
If this is correct, a confirmatory factor analysis in which the latent variables are defined as the 
degree of coordination in each sphere of the political economy should do a good job in accounting 
for the observed covariance between a set of indicators representing the institutional conditions 
associated with different types of coordination in those spheres.  
 
H2: The underlying latent variables corresponding to each sphere of the economy should reflect 
variation along a spectrum running from market coordination to strategic coordination. 
 
If this is correct, the factor loadings produced by the confirmatory factor analysis should be 
consistent. This means that if an observable indicator of institutional support for strategic 
coordination loads positively (negatively) onto a given latent variable, other indicators of support 
for strategic coordination should also have positive (negative) factor loadings for this latent 
variable; whereas indicators of support for market coordination should have negative (positive) 
factor loadings.  
 
H3: It is possible to identify a distinctive set of liberal market economies that make extensive use 
of market coordination and another set of coordinated market economies that make extensive use 
of strategic coordination. 
 
If this is correct, when the factor loadings are used to construct scores for each nation, the nations 
identified by the case study literature as liberal market economies should be located toward the 
'market' end of the dimension for each sphere, and those identified as coordinated market 
economies should be located closer to the ‘strategic’ end for each sphere. 
 
  8  The central obstacle to such an analysis is the paucity of relevant indicators available for more 
than a few countries.  The measurement of coordination poses special difficulties.  In principle, 
types of coordination are observable, but intense observation is required.  In only one sphere has 
coordination been assessed in this way, namely that of wage bargaining.  Accordingly, we 
employ two independent assessments of coordination in wage bargaining. The other variables 
used in the factor analysis are all indicators of institutional features of the political economy that 
can reasonably be said to reflect or provide support for one type of coordination or the other. We 
have identified variables that extend across two important spheres of the political economy, those 
pertinent to labour relations and corporate governance.  The observations were drawn from the 
1990-95 period, the latest for which comparable data is available. 
  The variables employed in the factor analysis are as follows:
15  
 
Shareholder Power: reflects the legal protection and likely-influence over firms of ordinary 
shareholders relative to managers or dominant shareholders. It is a composite measure of legal 
regulations covering six issues: the availability of proxy voting, deposit requirements for shares, 
the election of directors, the legal recourse available to minority shareholders, shareholders’ rights 
to issues of new stock, and the calling of shareholder meetings. Regulations governing each issue 
are coded 0 or 1 and summed.  Higher scores indicate that ordinary shareholders enjoy more rights 
vis-a-vis managers and dominant shareholders.
16  
 
Dispersion of Control: indicates how many firms in the economy are widely-held relative to the 
number with controlling shareholders. Taking the smallest ten firms with market capitalization of 
common equity of at least $500 million at the end of 1995 as a sample of firms, it reports the 
percentage that do not have a controlling shareholder, defined as one who controls, directly or 
indirectly, more than 10 percent of the voting rights in the firm.  Higher values indicate that larger 
proportions of firms in the economy are widely-held.
17  
 
  9  Size of Stock Market: the market valuation of equities on the stock exchanges of a nation as a 
percentage of its gross domestic product in 1993.
18 
 
Level of Wage Coordination: the level at which unions normally coordinate wage-claims and 
employers coordinate wage-offers where 3 represents the national level, 2 the intermediate level, 
and 1 firm level. Levels of coordination for unions and employers are assessed separately and 
averaged.  Higher values indicate higher levels of coordination in wage setting.
19  
 
Degree of Wage Coordination: reflects estimates by the OECD Secretariat of the degree to 
which wage bargaining is (strategically) coordinated by unions and employers along a scale on 
which 3 indicates coordinated and 1 indicates uncoordinated. Observations are for 1994.  Higher 
values indicate higher levels of wage coordination.
20  
 
Labour Turnover: is an indicator of the fluidity of national labour markets and reports the 
number of employees who had held their jobs for less than one year as a percentage of all 
employees surveyed in 1995.
21  
 
The appropriateness of these variables for the analysis should be apparent from our description of 
liberal and coordinated market economies.  The first three variables reflect institutional variation 
in the sphere of corporate governance of the sort highlighted by the varieties of capitalism 
approach.  Where the balance of influence tilts toward dominant shareholders, ownership 
relatively concentrated, and equity markets small, securing access to external finance and 
negotiating corporate control is more likely to involve firms in strategic interaction within 
corporate networks. When these conditions are reversed, issues of finance and corporate control 
are determined by more competitive markets.  The next three variables reflect relevant variation 
in the sphere of labour relations.  Two assess the level and degree of strategic coordination in 
  10  wage bargaining.  Labour turnover reflects the frequency with which workers move from one 
firm, a measure of the fluidity of labour markets. 
 
   Figure  1  about  here 
 
Since the number of indicators available for such an analysis is limited and the likelihood 
of some measurement error high, we entered the analysis with low expectations.  Given these 
constraints, the results are highly supportive of the terms the varieties of capitalism literature uses 
to characterize political economies. We performed the confirmatory factor analysis whose 
structure is presented in Figure 1.
22  Table 1 reports the estimates of the linear relationship 
between the latent and observable variables (factor loadings) as well as a set of indicators of the 
‘goodness of fit’ of the overall model.  All of the factor loadings were significant by conventional 
standards and signed in the appropriate manner.  The fit indicators suggest the model does a good 
job of explaining the covariance among the observed variables.  As expected, the estimated 
correlation between the levels of coordination found in each sphere of the economy was high (-
.81).
23 These results suggest that the first two hypotheses examined here should be accepted 
rather than rejected. 
 
    Table 1 about here. 
 
How well do these results conform to the cross-national patterns postulated by the 
varieties of capitalism literature?  Using the factor loadings, we construct scores for each nation 
for each factor, normalized to lie between 0 and 1.  These scores are reported in Table 2, and 
Figure 2 arrays each of the OECD nations for which we have scores in a two dimensional space 
where movement away from the origin along the X-axis reflects higher levels of strategic (vs 
  11  market) coordination in corporate governance and movement up the Y-axis reflects higher levels 
of strategic coordination in labour relations.  If the varieties-of-capitalism approach to 
understanding the institutional differences among developed political economies is correct, we 
should expect to see a clustering pattern: liberal and coordinated market economies should be 
found primarily in the southwest and northeast quadrants, respectively. 
 
    Table 2 and Figure 2 about here. 
 
The results are broadly supportive of the hypothesis.  As the regression line indicates, 
there is a strong and statistically significant relationship in the predicted direction between 
coordination in labour relations and corporate governance. Nations cluster toward the southwest 
and northeast quadrants of the diagram, as the theory would lead us to expect.  Six nations, all 
normally identified by varieties of capitalism theory as liberal market economies, cluster to the 
southwest, on or below the regression line.  The economies of northern Europe generally 
identified as CMEs cluster toward the northeast in this two-dimensional space. 
Japan and Switzerland are the two most obvious outliers.  We view their position as the 
result of measurement error associated with the limitations of our measure for coordination in 
corporate governance.  The latter attaches considerable weight to the size of the stock market and 
both nations have large stock markets relative to their GDP.  But there is also extensive cross-
shareholding in these nations not picked-up by our measure of shareholder dispersion because 
many of the relevant holdings fall below our 10 per cent cut-off.
24  Nevertheless, these cross-
shareholdings limit hostile takeovers and serve as vehicles for network monitoring.  In short, we 
think an accurate assignment of these cases would put them into the northeast quadrant of the 
diagram. The coordination of labour relations in the Netherlands and Belgium may also be 
underestimated here, reflecting OECD figures that may underestimate coordination in labour 
  12  relations.  Given the potential for such measurement error in indices taken entirely from external 
sources, however, the correspondence between the location of economies in Figure 2 and the 
account of such economies given by the varieties of capitalism literature is striking. 
The proximity of various nations to one another in this institutional space also facilitates 
more fine-grained assessment of variations among the OECD economies.  Correcting for 
measurement error, there are four distinct clusters of nations.  Among the liberal market 
economies, the United States and the United Kingdom appear as relatively ‘pure’ cases, while 
four other liberal market economies stand slightly apart by virtue of systems of corporate 
governance in which market coordination is not as fully developed.  On the other side of Figure 2, 
the nations most often identified as coordinated market economies lie near or above the 
regression line, indicating high levels of strategic coordination in both their labour and financial 
markets. 
Six nations lie to the east in the Figure but clearly below the regression line (Sweden lies 
just slightly below). This is especially interesting because there has been some controversy about 
whether four of these nations (Spain, Portugal, France and Italy) are coordinated market 
economies or examples of another distinctive type of capitalism often associated with high levels 
of state intervention.
25 Figure 2 clarifies some of the issues that render these ambiguous cases.  
These nations all have institutional capacities for strategic coordination in labour relations and 
corporate governance that are higher than those of LMEs.  However, their capacities for strategic 
coordination in labour relations tend to be lower than those in northern Europe, probably because 
their union movements are still divided along what used to be called ‘confessional’ lines.  
Although strategic coordination is clearly more important in these nations than in liberal market 
economies, these findings suggest there may be systematic differences in the operation of 
southern, as compared to northern, European economies.
26 
 
  13  3. Congruence Across Spheres of the Political Economy  
Although we have focused on corporate governance and labour relations because they are the two 
most important spheres of the economy, regulating the supply of labour and capital, the varieties 
of capitalism approach also expects systematic variation, between LMEs and CMEs, across other 
spheres of the political economy, including those concerned with product-market competition, 
social protection, vocational training, and inter-firm relations.  Much of the force of the varieties-
of-capitalism approach as a theory of comparative capitalism rests on its claim to be able to 
specify systematic variations across nations that extend to many spheres of the political economy.  
We turn now to assessment of that claim.  
In some cases, the relevant variation is in institutionalized practices; in others, it is in the 
formal institutions or regulatory regimes that govern endeavours in each sphere.  In the varieties-
of-capitalism literature, the theoretical basis for expectations of institutional congruence lies in 
the contention that, where institutional complementarities are available across spheres, firms and 
governments will often (although not always) adapt their strategies to take advantage of these 
complementarities.
27  The relationships on which we focus are as follows. 
Varieties-of-capitalism analysts argue that, where labour relations are based on high 
levels of job mobility and firm-level wage-setting, training systems that provide general skills 
through formal education will be more efficient than collaborative training schemes that confer 
industry-specific skills, because workers who must frequently shift jobs have strong incentives to 
acquire the general skills that qualify them for other positions.  Conversely, where labour 
relations are based on strong unions and coordinated wage bargaining, it will be efficient for 
firms to operate collaborative training schemes conferring high levels of industry-specific skills. 
High wages set at the industry level encourage workers to acquire industry-specific skills, and 
they make it more difficult for non-training firms to poach workers by offering wage premiums.  
The organizations that coordinate wages can also be used to coordinate training systems.
28  
  14    A similar set of arguments specifies the potential for institutional complementarities 
between the character of corporate governance and the character of inter-firm relations.  Firms 
are said to find it easier to enter into collaborative arrangements with other firms – for the 
purposes of research, product development or technology transfer – where the institutions of 
corporate governance limit the demands on them to maximize current profitability or shareholder 
value, because they can then make more credible commitments to the incomplete contracts and 
co-specific investments that such collaboration requires.  Conversely, where fluid capital markets 
facilitate the movement of funds from one endeavour to another, it will be more efficient for firms 
to access technology by acquiring other enterprises or new personnel rather than engage in long-
term collaboration with other firms.
29  
Estevez et al. argue that social policies providing generous employment and 
unemployment protection will be complementary to production strategies based on the use of 
specific skills because they provide workers with incentives for acquiring those skills.
30 Hall and 
Soskice argue that high levels of product-market regulation may be complementary to financial 
systems based on network monitoring, to wage coordination, and to inter-firm collaboration in 
research and development because they limit the intensity of competition in product markets that 
might otherwise undermine cooperation in these other spheres.
31 
The varieties of capitalism perspective also identifies potential complementarities 
between institutional arrangements in the broader political economy and the strategy or structure 
of firms themselves. This is the basis for an important set of claims that corporate structures and 
strategies are likely to vary systematically across nations. The theory suggests that, where fluid 
labour markets facilitate lay-offs and dispersed financial markets often demand them, it will be 
advantageous for firms to adopt hierarchies that vest management with extensive prerogatives 
over such matters.  Conversely, where strong trade unions or regulatory regimes inhibit lay-offs, 
corporate structures that provide stakeholders with more influence over enterprise decision-
  15  making may offer efficiencies by strengthening the credibility of the commitments a firm can 
make to its employees and thus the levels of cooperation it can secure from them.  On such 
reasoning, the approach contends that firm strategy will vary systematically across political 
economies in tandem with the institutional support provided there for different types of 
coordination. Firms are said to exploit this institutional support to derive competitive advantages 
that cumulate into comparative institutional advantages at the national level.
32  
  In short, the varieties of capitalism literature contends that systematic variation across 
nations is present not only in labour relations and corporate governance, but also across many 
other spheres of the political economy, extending to relevant regulatory regimes and firm 
practices.  To assess this contention, we have sought indicators for the types of variation in 
institutions or practices that varieties of capitalism theory expects to find in a wide range of 
spheres of the political economy.  Finding indicators for the relevant institutional dimensions is a 
major challenge if more than a handful of cases are to be considered and we are not to code them 
ourselves – a technique we have resisted in order to avoid biasing the tests. However, we have 
found indicators for the relevant types of institutional variation across seven spheres where the 
varieties-of-capitalism approach suggests major complementarities are available and some 
institutional congruence should be found.
33  For labour relations and corporate governance, we 
use the same indicators employed in the preceding analysis.  The others are as follows: 
 
Social Protection refers to the level of support provided to the unemployed and to limitations on 
the right of firms to lay-off workers. We measure it by combining the indices of ‘unemployment 
protection’ and ‘employment protection’ devised by Estevez et al. using the factor scores 
produced when an exploratory factor analysis is applied to the two indices.  Higher values indicate 
higher levels of social protection.
34 
 
  16  Product Market Regulation refers to the limits placed on competition in product markets by the 
regulatory restrictions that national governments impose on businesses.  The measure is based on 
an OECD survey of many types of regulatory practices combined into a composite measure 
through multi-level factor analysis by Nicoletti et al.
35  Higher values indicate product market 
regulations more restrictive of competition. 
 
Training Systems are assessed with a view to establishing the extent of institutional support a 
nation provides for the development of vocational skills in young workers beyond what they 
secure in formal secondary or university education.  In general, this entails apprenticeship 
schemes or training programs dependent on the collaborative involvement of firms. The measure 
is based on the factor scores produced by an exploratory factor analysis on two variables: the 
number of pupils at the upper secondary level in vocational or technical training programs as a 
proportion of all students enrolled in educational programs and the mean scores on a literacy test 
secured by a sample of workers between the ages of 20 and 25 who left school before completing 
secondary education.
36  Higher values indicate higher levels of institutional support for this kind 
of vocational training. 
 
Inter-Firm Relations refer to the institutionalized practices that link firms to other firms 
producing goods and services.  Of particular relevance is the extent to which firms collaborate 
with others to secure access to new technology or markets relative to their reliance on competitive 
market relations for such purposes.  Mergers and acquisitions are typical of the latter.  
Accordingly, the measure is based on the annual number of mergers and acquisitions in a nation 
during 1990-97 expressed as a ratio of its population.
37 We reverse the direction of the measure so 
that higher values indicate more inter-firm collaboration. 
 
  17  To assess the ancillary claim that systematic variation in the institutions of the political economy 
will be associated with distinctive types of firm structures and strategies, we have also sought 
measures for the latter, as follows: 
 
Managerial Prerogative refers to the extent to which firms concentrate control over their 
operations in the hands of top management.  On the premise that compensation will correspond to 
the level of responsibility they are assigned for the firm’s operations, our measure is the average 
compensation of chief executive officers as a ratio of the compensation of average production 
workers in manufacturing in 1999.
38 Higher values indicate higher levels of managerial 
prerogative. 
 
Employment Tenure is a measure of the length of time employees typically stay with the same 
firm, assessed here by median employer tenure in 1995.
39 This can be read as a reflection of the 
extent to which firm strategies turn on the development of close relations with a stable workforce 
rather than on production regimes that can be operated by more transient and potentially less-
skilled labour. 
 
Firm Strategy is a composite measure tapping many of the core practices of firms, including the 
use they make of multidivisional project teams, participatory work teams, alliances with other 
firms, close, voice-based relations with suppliers, long-term relations with investors, and 
cooperative labour-management relations built on employment guarantees. Each practice has been 
coded on a 3 point scale and combined via factor analysis by Hicks and Kenworthy.
40  Higher 
values indicate firm strategies that make more extensive use of these ‘cooperative’ practices. 
 
Using these variables, we test the following hypothesis: 
H4. Institutionalized practices extending across the spheres of the political economy identified 
here, including those associated with firm strategies, vary systematically such that the practices 
  18  associated with market coordination are present in multiple spheres of political economies 
classified as LMEs and practices associated with strategic coordination are present in multiple 
spheres of political economies classified as CMEs.  
 
If this is correct, there should be significant correlations across spheres at the national level among 
the variables representing the institutional practices the varieties-of-capitalism perspective 
identifies as important to coordination. 
 
    Figure  3  about  here. 
 
Figure 3 summarizes the results of this test.  The boxes around ‘firm strategy’ represent the four 
spheres in which a firm coordinates with other actors to accomplish its principal endeavours. The 
two boxes at the top indicate policy regimes relevant to this coordination. The lines between the 
boxes correspond to hypotheses about complementarities generated by the varieties-of-capitalism 
literature.  Using cross-national comparisons of all the cases for which we have relevant 
measures, we have calculated correlation coefficients indicating whether the presence of 
institutional practices of a particular type in one sphere are associated with institutional practices 
in adjacent spheres that correspond to those posited by a varieties-of-capitalism perspective. That 
perspective predicts positive coefficients across the diagram.  The results are impressive.  The 
coefficients in Figure 3 are uniformly positive and relatively large. All are statistically significant 
at the .05 level. The uniformity of the results is striking.  They tend to confirm the varieties-of-
capitalism contention that differences based on market-oriented or strategic coordination stretch 
systematically across multiple spheres of the political economy.  The results on firm strategy 
indicated in Figure 3 are also notable: they confirm that corporate strategies tend to vary 
systematically with the institutional support available for different types of coordination in the 
political economy.  Table 3 provides further evidence by comparing the relationship between two 
  19  indicators for corporate strategy and national scores on the coordination indices.  In each case, 
there is a strong and statistically significant correlation in the direction posited by the theory.   
 
   Table  3  about  here. 
 
4. The Effect of Institutional Complementarities on Economic Growth 
These results indicate that the patterns of institutionalized practices the varieties-of-capitalism 
perspective expects to see across the developed economies are often present there.  We turn now 
to one of the most important propositions linked to this observation, namely to the claim that 
there is, not only congruence among institutional practices in different spheres of the economy, 
but that some of these practices can be complementary to others.  Institutional practices are said 
to be complementary when each raises the returns available from the other.   We focus on one of 
the most fundamental sets of complementarities, namely those between institutional practices in 
the sphere of corporate governance and in labour relations.   
Working from the formulations of Aoki, Hall and Soskice develop a theoretical rationale 
for why such complementarities might exist.
41  They argue that institutions in the sphere of 
corporate governance that encourage cross-shareholding and concentrate control in the hands of 
management, thereby limiting hostile takeovers and providing firms with access to sources of 
finance that turn on reputational monitoring, enhance the efficiency of institutional practices in 
the sphere of labour relations that provide high levels of employment security and long job-
tenures as well as forms of wage-setting that depend on strategic interaction among employers 
associations and trade unions.
42  In the face of a fluctuating economy, firms that do not have to 
sustain current profitability are better placed to make long-term commitments to their employees 
about wages and jobs, and therefore to realize the gains available from deploying production 
  20  regimes based on such commitments.  This combination of institutions corresponds to the 
institutional patterns in CMEs. 
Conversely, where firms are more dependent on dispersed equity markets, face the 
prospect of hostile takeovers, and confront regulations that give shareholders more power relative 
to stakeholders, the autonomy of the firm and its managers will be more dependent on current 
profitability.  Here, labour markets allowing for high levels of labour turnover and competitive 
wage-setting will be more efficient, because they enable managers to reduce staffing levels 
quickly or to hold down wages in response to fluctuations in current profitability.  This 
combination of institutional practices corresponds to the case of a LME.  In summary terms, the 
efficiencies available to firms should be higher in settings where the spheres of labour relations 
and corporate governance are both dominated by the practices characteristic of either strategic or 
market coordination and, according to the varieties of capitalism analysis, these efficiencies 
should show up in improved aggregate economic performance.
43 
Our indicator for aggregate economic performance will be rates of economic growth per 
capita, widely accepted as the best measure of such performance and appropriate for testing 
postulates about the general efficiency of the economy.  Moreover, this measure provides an 
exceptionally hard test for institutional analyses such as these. Because aggregate rates of growth 
depend on the efficiency of the entire economy, specific sets of institutions will have to make 
substantial contributions to efficiency to show up in aggregate rates of growth.  To summarize the 
character of coordination in labour relations and corporate governance, we use the two indices 
developed here.  Although time-variant measures would be preferable, the difficulties of 
measuring coordination and data limitations preclude them.  However, we think the use of these 
two indices is appropriate because they capture differences across political economies widely 
seen as stable over time. As a check on this, we examined Kenworthy’s measures for coordination 
in wage setting, which do vary over time.
44  On his measure, only three of our eighteen countries 
  21  evince much fluctuation on his measure over the 1971-1997 period, and we assess the specific 
import of those cases for our results below.  Our own examination of institutional change in the 
1980s and 1990s also finds considerable stability in the cross-national differences relevant to 
coordination.  Therefore, this approach to the measurement of coordination should be adequate 
for the purposes at hand. 
We estimate the interaction effects between these two measures of coordination and their 
impact, with a range of appropriate controls standard in the growth literature, on annual rates of 
per capita economic growth for twenty OECD nations from 1971 to 1997, taking two different 
econometric approaches to the panel data.
45 The two estimators we employed were pooled 
ordinary least squares regression with panel-corrected standard errors and the generalized least 
squares random effects estimator.
46 The former is traditionally employed for times series-cross 
section data, i.e. data sets in which the number of observations over time is large relative to the 
number of panels. The technique produces correct standard errors in the presence of an error term 
that is heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across countries. The latter is 
traditionally employed for panel data, i.e. data sets in which the number of panels is large relative 
to the observations over time. This technique produces consistent coefficient estimates and 
standard errors in the presence of a composite error term that consists of a (mean zero) time-
invariant, country-specific disturbance (representing unmeasured features of a polity that remain 
fixed over time) and a traditional country-year disturbance. Since the number of panels and time 
periods in our dataset were roughly equivalent (N = 20, T = 27), we present the results for both 
estimators.
47  
  For each econometric technique, we estimate two separate regression equations, one 
containing the coordination indices and their interaction effect along with a standard set of 
economic controls, and another containing the coordination indices and their interaction effect, 
  22  the economic controls and a set of political institutional variables. The two equations estimated 
were the following:      
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where C
LR
i represents the character of coordination in labour relations in country i and  C
CG
i 
represents the character of coordination in its sphere of corporate governance. Estimation of these 
models was used to test the following hypothesis derived from the varieties-of-capitalism 
perspective on institutional complementarities: 
 
H5: When there are higher levels of market (strategic) coordination in the sphere of labour 
relations or corporate governance, rates of economic growth increase as the level of market 
(strategic) coordination in the other sphere increases. 
 
If this is correct, the interaction term in the model, C
LR
i* C
CG
i, should be statistically significant 
and positive. A significant coefficient indicates that the impact of coordination in one sphere is 
dependent on the character of coordination in the other sphere, and a positive coefficient indicates 
that analogous types of coordination in the two spheres raise rates of growth. 
 
The controls employed here are standard for estimating rates of economic growth:  lnGDPi is the 
log of gross domestic product per capita for country i at the beginning of the period controlling 
for ‘catch up’ effects that generate higher rates of growth in nations at lower levels of economic 
development.  Intit represents international demand conditions measured by the average rate of 
growth for all countries in our sample in period t except country i, weighted by the trade openness 
of country i. it is the country’s rate of inflation measured by the rate of increase in its consumer 
  23  price index.  In the developed world, where rates of inflation are moderate, we expect them to be 
positively related to rates of growth.  Expit is the percentage change in the income terms of trade 
for country i weighted by trade openness: adverse movements should lower rates of economic 
growth. Dit is the dependency ratio measured as the share of the population below the age of 15 or 
above the age of 65.  A higher proportion of dependents is expected to lower rates of economic 
growth. 
In recent years, political economists have evinced growing concern for the influence of 
electoral institutions on political rents, productivity and economic growth.
48  Accordingly, in our 
second regression equation, we include two variables to capture the potential influence of the 
electoral-institutional environment: PLUit, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a majority of 
representatives in lower house are elected by plurality voting and 0 otherwise; and MAGit, is the 
average district magnitude in the lower chamber. Based on the literature about political rents, we 
expect PLUit to be associated with higher economic growth and, since low district magnitude is a 
proxy for barriers to entry in the political system, higher levels of MAGit may be associated with 
greater economic growth. In addition, we include a variable designed to capture the influence of 
partisan preferences: Leftcabit reflects left party cabinet portfolios as proportion of total cabinet 
portfolios. Detailed variable descriptions are provided in the appendix. 
 
    Table 4 about here. 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the estimations. The parameter estimates are broadly stable 
across the four models.  In all, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive, of considerable 
magnitude, and statistically-significant.  These results tend to confirm the presence of substantial 
complementarities between the spheres of labour relations and corporate governance of the sort 
postulated by varieties-of-capitalism theory. 
  24    Using model RE•1a for the purposes of simulation, Figure 4 depicts the impact of 
coordination in corporate governance on economic growth for different levels of coordination in 
labour relations (holding control variables fixed at their mean values). Two trajectories are 
shown. In the first case, coordination in labour relations is held constant at its minimum value (0) 
and coordination in corporate governance is allowed to vary from minimum (0) to maximum (1). 
In this instance, the predicted growth rate declines from 2.99 per cent to .61 per cent.  In the 
second case, coordination in labour relations is held constant at its maximum value (1) and 
coordination in corporate governance is allowed to vary from minimum to maximum. In this 
instance, the predicted growth rate increases from 1.21 per cent to 2.83 per cent.   
 
    Figure 4 about here. 
 
 The simulations show clear evidence of interaction effects between the character of 
coordination in the two spheres. Rates of growth are highest where competitive markets 
coordinate both spheres, or where strategic coordination is high in both. Where labour relations 
are strategically coordinated, substantial efficiencies seem to be available from strategic-
coordination in the sphere of corporate governance.  Where corporate governance is dominated 
by fluid equity markets, however, rates of growth are substantially higher when labour markets 
are also fluid and competitive. 
  Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to test for the presence of specific 
complementarities across other spheres of the political economy, we conduct one other 
assessment of these contentions at the aggregate level.  The varieties-of-capitalism approach 
implies that aggregate economic performance should be better in nations whose institutionalized 
practices correspond more closely to relatively pure types of LMEs or CMEs.  Long term rates of 
growth should be higher in countries where market or strategic coordination is more fully 
  25  developed across multiple spheres of the political economy, compared to those where the type of 
coordination varies across spheres or where either type of coordination is secured but in less 
complete form.  This implication yields the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: Rates of economic growth should be higher in nations where levels of market coordination or 
levels of strategic coordination are high across spheres of the political economy but lower in 
nations where neither type of coordination is so well-developed or market and strategic 
coordination are combined. 
 
If this is correct, estimates for rates of growth when other relevant factors are controlled should 
show higher rates of growth in nations where levels of market or strategic coordination are 
consistently high across spheres and lower rates in other nations. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, we created a single coordination index using the separate indices 
of coordination in corporate governance and labour relations. The coordination index measuring 
the balance of market and strategic coordination in the political economy for country i is equal to: 
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where CGi and LRi refer to the score of country i on the coordination in corporate governance and 
coordination in labour relations indices, respectively.  We then estimated the effect of 
coordination on annual rates of per capita economic growth for OECD nations from 1971 to 1997 
using regression models of the following form: 
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  26  If the relationship between growth and coordination is U-shaped, β1 should be negative and β2 
positive. The controls are the standard ones used previously and, once again, we estimated the 
model using two different types of econometric specifications. 
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   Table 5 reports the results of these three estimations.  In all, the coefficients on 
coordination are significant, of the same sign, and of similar magnitude, increasing our 
confidence in the results.  The significance and signs of the coefficients on Ci and Ci
2 indicate that 
the relationship between coordination and economic growth is non-linear. Using model RE•2a for 
the simulation, Figure 5 shows the estimated relationship between coordination and growth when 
the control variables are held at their means.  The U-shaped relationship is apparent.  Where the 
institutional structure of the political economy allows for either higher levels of market 
coordination or higher levels of strategic coordination, estimated growth rates are larger than they 
are when there is more variation in the types of coordination present in the political economy.  
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These results suggest that the varieties-of-capitalism approach to institutional 
complementarities, built on the distinction between market and strategic coordination, has real 
merit.  When complementary institutions are present across spheres of the political economy, 
rates of economic growth are higher. The institutional complementarities identified by this 
perspective appear to offer general efficiencies. 
  We conducted a number of robustness checks on these results, with particular attention to 
cases that might not be coded entirely accurately as noted above, namely Japan and Switzerland 
  27  as noted above, and to cases where Kenworthy’s index for coordination in wage-setting shows 
more than negligible movement over this time period, namely Denmark, Italy and New Zealand, 
as well as the UK which showed some movement prior to 1980.
49  We asked whether the 
exclusion of any of these cases, singly or together, would affect our findings. Table 6 presents the 
results of these re-estimations. The table depicts the coefficient on the interaction between 
coordination in labour relations and coordination in corporate governance as well as the 
coefficients on the overall coordination index and its square for each combination of excluded 
cases. The table clearly suggests that our results do not depend on the inclusion of any one of 
these cases. Our findings are remarkably robust to the exclusion of particular cases, and even to 
the simultaneous exclusion of all potentially problematic cases. Outliers and unmeasured changes 
in coordination over time do not appear to pose serious threats to our conclusions.    
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   5. Political and Economic Adjustment Paths 
We conclude by turning to issues of institutional change.  Although the historical record is 
generally supportive of the varieties of capitalism approach to comparative capitalism, a number 
of scholars have raised questions about the persistence of the cross-national differences identified 
by this analysis in the face of international pressures associated with ‘globalization’.
50  The 
varieties-of-capitalism literature addresses such issues.  Some contributors to it explore the 
response of firms and governments to pressures for change, outlining how existing institutions 
structure processes of change.
51  These formulations generate a set of predictions about national 
adjustment paths that we now examine empirically with a view to establishing whether the 
categories generated by the varieties of capitalism perspective remain a relevant typology.  
 
  28  Economic Dynamics 
There are both economic and political sides to this matter. The principal economic issue is 
whether institutions that appear to have been complementary in previous decades continue to be 
complementary as secular developments, such as the shift from manufacturing to services, 
technological change, and international liberalization, alter the economic challenges facing the 
developed democracies.
52  These developments might alter the efficiencies available from 
existing combinations of institutions.  If productivity growth is lower in services, for instance, the 
growth of that sector may undercut the efficiency gains available from systems of coordinated 
wage bargaining or of social protection that sustain high wage floors.
53  Conversely, in epochs of 
rapid technological advance that increase the opportunities for radical innovation, the market-
oriented complementarities of liberal market economies that lend themselves to this type of 
innovation may offer even higher returns relative those found in coordinated market economies 
which are better at incremental innovation.
54 International integration could alter the value of an 
economy’s comparative institutional advantages by improving access to production sites offering 
other kinds of complementarities.
55  
  It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the effects of each of these developments 
on institutional complementarities.  However, a summary impression can be formed by 
comparing the economic impact of particular combinations of institutions in more recent years 
with their impact in an earlier period.  For this purpose, we re-estimate the models for the 
economic impact of coordination in labour relations and corporate governance, allowing the 
coefficient on the interaction of these variables to vary across two different time periods, 1971-84 
and 1985-97. These estimations are used to test the following hypothesis: 
 
  29  H7: Secular economic developments over the past two decades have not altered the efficiency of 
the institutional complementarities between labour relations and corporate governance posited 
by a varieties-of-capitalism perspective. 
 
If this hypothesis is correct, the coefficient on the interaction term between coordination in labour 
relations and corporate governance, C
LR
i* C
CG
i, should be positive, statistically-significant, and of 
comparable magnitude across both periods. An F-test to evaluate the presence of structural change 
should fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference across the two periods. 
 
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 7. For both time periods, the coefficients on 
the interaction of coordination in corporate governance and labour relations are positive and 
statistically significant. Moreover, the difference in the magnitude of the coefficients across the 
time periods is miniscule, suggesting that the impact of institutional complementarities in these 
two spheres of the economy has not appreciably diminished with time. For both regressions, we 
performed an F-test, which indicates that we should not reject the null hypothesis of no difference 
across the two periods. This supports the hypothesis that secular economic developments in the 
1980s and 1990s did not alter the basic complementarities identified by the varieties-of-capitalism 
perspective.       
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Political Dynamics 
The varieties-of-capitalism literature also advances a particular view of the political dynamics 
associated with globalization.  This view is built on the contention that the market-oriented 
institutions of liberal market economies encourage firms, holders of capital, and workers to invest 
in switchable assets, whereas institutional support for strategic interaction in coordinated market 
  30  economies encourages higher levels of investment in specific assets.
56 Fluid markets that 
facilitate the transfer of resources among uses enhance the returns to switchable assets in LMEs.  
In CMEs, better institutional support for the formation of credible commitments reduces th
of investing in co-specific assets whose value depends on the cooperation of other actors.
e risks 
   
These patterns of investment are significant because each generates a different politics.  
In the face of an exogenous shock threatening returns to existing activities, holders of mobile 
assets will be tempted to ‘exit’ those activities to seek higher returns elsewhere, while holders of 
specific assets face higher incentives to exercise ‘voice’ in defence of existing activities.
57  The 
argument is analogous to the distinction drawn between a Hecksher-Ohlin world, where factors 
are mobile and shifts in relative prices (of the sort associated with increasing economic openness) 
generate conflict between the holders of basic factors, such as capital and labour, and a Ricardo-
Viner world of sector-specific factors where shifts in relative prices inspire inter-sectoral conflicts 
that unite employers and workers in defence of sectoral interests.
58  
  From this perspective, the varieties-of-capitalism literature argues that the political 
response to contemporary economic challenges will vary across liberal and coordinated market 
economies.  In LMEs, the response will be market-oriented. When returns to existing activities 
are threatened, holders of mobile assets, such as workers with general skills or owners of capital 
on fluid equity markets, will move their assets to new activities.  Many will be interested, 
therefore, in rendering markets even more fluid and governments may be responsive to them.  
Moreover, where nations respond to shocks by relying on markets to adjust prices and wages, 
substantial shifts in the distribution of income are likely to occur, reflecting the advantages of 
those with market-power. 
  In coordinated market economies, by contrast, the varieties-of-capitalism perspective 
expects s economic challenges to inspire a political response mediated by higher levels of asset 
specificity.  When returns to existing activities are threatened, holders of specific assets, such as 
  31  workers with industry-specific skills and owners of enterprises deeply-invested in co-specific 
assets, will find it difficult to shift to new activities. As a result, they will be less inclined to 
favour deregulatory initiatives that increase market competition and more inclined to demand 
institutional support for existing activities.  The result is likely to be a much slower process of 
liberalization and a politics that unites workers and employers in ‘cross-class’ coalitions of 
sectoral defence.
59  
  These postulates about political dynamics suggest that economic shocks will produce 
different institutional outcomes in liberal and coordinated market economies.  Although all 
capitalist economies use markets to adjust and international integration automatically renders 
some markets more competitive, this analysis anticipates more rapid deregulation in liberal 
market economies, where there should be more political support for it, compared to coordinated 
market economies, where cross-class coalitions support existing regulatory regimes.  The 
perspective anticipates change in all countries, including some liberalization in CMEs, but 
institutional adjustment paths that diverge across different types of political economies.
60   
  In order to assess whether that account accurately describes the response to recent 
challenges, we examine a number of indicators beginning with levels of inequality.
 If LMEs 
respond to economic challenges by relying more heavily on competitive markets to reset wages 
and prices, we should see more rapid increases in income inequality there in response to the 
recent experiences of globalization.  Figure 6 show that this has indeed been the pattern.
61    
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To what extent have the institutional differences that underpin different modes of 
coordination narrowed in the face of globalization?  To form an assessment, we assemble 
indicators for the character of institutional practices in six spheres relevant to the varieties-of-
  32  capitalism arguments.  The observations are drawn from the 1980s and the 1990s, including the 
early 2000s where data was available, and they are reported in Table 8.  We distinguish among 
liberal market economies, coordinated market economies, and a third group of Southern European 
nations termed here ‘mixed market economies’ because they are not definitively classified into 
the other two categories by the varieties-of-capitalism literature and cluster distinctively in Figure 
2.
62 
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The figures presented in Table 8 display substantial differences between CMEs and 
LMEs during the 1980s of the sort associated with different types of coordination.  Of most 
interest, however, are the changes taking place from 1980 to the early 2000s.  Did these 
differences between LMEs and CMEs narrow in ways that reflect convergence on a single 
economic model?  Table 8 shows that the direction of institutional reform is often similar across 
the two types of political economies.  But, when variation in the pace and extent of movement is 
considered, substantial differences in the institutional practices of CMEs and LMEs remain.  
Although the locus of wage bargaining has moved downward in most of these economies, for 
instance, the proportion of workers covered by a collective agreement declined much rapidly in 
liberal than in coordinated market economies.  In the realm of social protection, social spending 
has crept upward and employment protection has declined, but differences between the two types 
of economies remain pronounced.  While LMEs sharpened market mechanisms, many CMEs 
cushioned their citizens against the effects of market adjustment with increases in benefit 
entitlements.
63 In the labour market, increases in part-time employment indicate a general 
movement toward labour market flexibility, but LMEs increase income inequality and CMEs 
reduce hours of work faster than their counterparts.  
  33  Especially intriguing are indicators for the institutional practices associated with firm 
strategy and finance.  Here, much has been made of changes in CMEs that seem to reflect 
convergence on the practices of LMEs.  However, these figures tell a more nuanced story.  In 
CMEs, the ratio of the compensation of chief executive officers to that of manufacturing workers 
and the size of stock markets increased, but the analogous increases in LMEs were also 
substantial, leaving large gaps in institutional practices between the two types of political 
economies, which is also apparent in the debt-to-equity ratios of non-financial enterprises.  The 
figures for earnings and employment tell a classic story of different adjustment paths.  
Strategically coordinated wage bargaining pushed real earnings up in CMEs at rates that outpaced 
those in LMEs, but effective forms of coordination in the workplace and high levels of 
investment kept the increase in unit labour costs in CMEs roughly commensurate with that of 
LMEs.  
On balance, we read these figures as suggesting that institutional practices did not 
converge dramatically in the decades after 1980.  Modest efforts were made to improve the 
flexibility of coordinated market economies, including some liberalization of labour and capital 
markets, but the pace of movement was slow enough to leave significant differences in 
institutional practices across the two types of political economies. The absence of more 
convergence in the face of intense pressures during the 1980s and 1990s suggests that the 
distinctions drawn by the varieties-of-capitalism literature may be relevant for years to come. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
We entered this project uncertain about whether we could find indicators for the relevant 
variables and what the tests of the hypotheses would reveal.  We leave it impressed with the 
  34  uniformity of the results.  The weight of the evidence suggests that the varieties-of-capitalism 
literature captures important differences among political economies.  The concepts of market-
oriented and strategic coordination do seem to reflect an underlying dimension distinguishing 
practices across countries in the spheres of labour relations and corporate governance.  The 
contention that institutional complementarities operate across these two spheres of the political 
economy is also borne out by the evidence.  Persistent cross-national differences in institutional 
practices in the face of intense pressures for convergence, suggests that, despite some 
liberalization in coordinated market economies, the distinctions central to the varieties-of-
capitalism perspective are likely to be of continuing value. 
  Our findings about complementarities have especially important implications for reform 
proposals now being considered in the developed world.  The deregulation of labour markets is a 
popular cause.  However, our evidence suggests that labour-market deregulation is likely to 
produce large economic gains only in nations where financial markets are correspondingly fluid 
(see Figure 4).  Otherwise, the gains in growth may be relatively small.  Many nations have come 
under pressure from international agencies or global enterprises to increase competition in 
markets for corporate governance. However, our estimates suggest that such steps may have 
positive effects only where labour markets are also highly fluid.   
The broader lesson is that those seeking to understand the effects of institutional change 
should pay careful attention to the potential for institutional complementarities across spheres of 
the political economy.  Most proposals to reform labour or capital markets are based on estimates 
of the effects of such reforms that consider data only for the sphere being reformed.  If the 
distribution of institutions across national cases were random, estimates generated from cross-
national data of this sort might produce accurate results.  But our evidence indicates that this 
distribution is far from random: nations with particular types of institutions in one sphere tend to 
have particular types of institutions in other spheres.  As a result, models that do not take 
  35  interaction effects across institutional spheres into account may attribute to one set of institutions 
effects that are actually generated by interaction among several sets of institutions. 
  This is a research agenda rather than a counsel of despair that finds complementarities 
everywhere.  Although there are undoubtedly other ones, the varieties-of-capitalism literature 
presents propositions about particular complementarities that can be examined more closely.  The 
range of institutional indicators available for doing so is growing, as is the evidence that such 
analyses can be fruitful.
64  In broad terms, this analysis lends weight to the theoretical 
perspectives advanced in the varieties-of-capitalism literature.  It suggests that the concepts of 
market-oriented and strategic coordination can illuminate the operation of many developed 
political economies and contribute important insights to understanding their politics and 
economic performance. 
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Table 1: Parameter estimates of coordination in corporate governance and labour 
relations CFA (N=20) 
   
Parameter  ML Estimate  
(standard errors in parentheses) 
 
11 
 
.96 
(.31) 
12  .24 
(.05) 
13  21.58 
(6.46) 
21  .53 
(.15) 
22  -3.63 
(1.46) 
23  .63 
(.12) 

2 = 4.71 (p-value=.79)   
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = .95   
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .92   
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = .80   
Correlation Matrix of Factors 
 Corp  Labour 
Corp 1.00 
 
 
Labour -.81 
(.12) 
1.00 
 
 
  37   
 
Table 2: Coordination in labour relations and corporate governance 
 
 
    
Labour Relations  Corporate Governance 
 
Australia 
 
.29 
 
.47 
Austria 1  1 
Belgium .50  .77 
Canada .09  .23 
Denmark .58  .65 
Finland .66  .71 
France .60  .82 
Germany .92  .95 
Ireland .28  .35 
Italy   .77  .99 
Japan .94  .72 
Netherlands .53  .74 
New Zealand  .09  .27 
Norway .81  .74 
Portugal   .62  .85 
Spain .54  .77 
Sweden .59  .71 
Switzerland .48  .44 
United Kingdom  .04  .14 
United States  0  0 
 
Note: Factor scores were constructed using Thomson’s regression method with correlated factors and then 
normalized to be between 0 and 1.
65 
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Table 3: The relationship between institutional support for strategic coordination 
and corporate strategy 
 
    
Correlation with Coordination 
in Labour Relations 
Correlation with Coordination 
in Corporate Governance 
   
Employment Tenure  .686 
(.002) 
.660 
(.003) 
 
Managerial Prerogative  -.764 
(.002) 
-.664 
(.013) 
 
Note: Significance levels in parentheses.  
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Table 4: The impact on rates of economic growth of interaction between 
coordination in labour relations and corporate governance  
 
Pooled OLS w/ Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors† 
Random Effects   
 
PCSE•1a 
 
PCSE•1b 
   
RE•1a 
 
RE•1b 
 
0 lnGDP  (i) 
 
-1.85*** 
(.637) 
 
-1.54** 
(.728) 
 
-2.02*** 
(.484) 
 
-1.74*** 
(.472) 
International Demand 
Conditions (it) 
2.27*** 
(.220) 
2.35*** 
(.178) 
2.12*** 
(.232) 
2.17*** 
(.235) 
 
 (it) 
 
-1.35 
(2.41) 
 
-1.06 
(1.95) 
 
-.119 
(2.21) 
 
-.558 
(2.23) 
 
Dependency Ratio  (it) 
 
9.66 
( 13.6) 
 
9.06 
(12.7) 
 
8.11 
( 11.4) 
 
3.22 
(11.4) 
 
Exports as capacity to 
import  (it) 
 
-.006 
(.051) 
 
-.004 
(.045) 
 
.019 
(.060) 
 
.001 
(.061) 
 
Plurality voting ( it) 
 
_ 
 
.866** 
(.345) 
 
_ 
 
 
.793*** 
(.296) 
 
District  
magnitude (it) 
 
_ 
 
.005 
(.006) 
 
_ 
 
.004 
(.004) 
 
Left cabinet (it) 
 
_ 
 
.582* 
(.302) 
 
_ 
 
.654** 
(.291) 
Coordination in 
Corporate 
Governance (i) 
 
-3.09** 
(1.26) 
 
-3.18*** 
( 1.19) 
 
-2.38** 
(1.13) 
 
-2.43** 
(1.08) 
 
Coordination in Labour 
Relations (i) 
 
-.747 
(1.52) 
 
.340 
(1.10) 
 
-1.78** 
(1.51) 
 
-.183 
(1.40) 
 
Corporate*Labour (i) 
 
 
3.18** 
( 1.29) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; (i) denotes panel-varying but time-invariant explanatory variable; (it) 
denotes panel-varying and time-varying explanatory variable;†model assumes panel-specific first-order 
autocorrelation; *** denotes significant at the .01 level; ** denotes significant at the .05 level; * denotes 
significant at the .1 level.  
 
2.73** 
(1.19) 
 
4.00** 
(1.63) 
 
2.87* 
(1.50) 
N  538  528 538 528 
R2  .27  .28 .21 .24 
χ2  176  308 141 160 
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses; (i) denotes panel-varying but time-invariant explanatory variable; (it) 
denotes panel-varying and time-varying explanatory variable; †  model assumes panel-specific first-order 
autocorrelation; *** denotes significant at the .01 level; ** denotes significant at the .05 level; * denotes 
significant at the .1 level.   
 
Pooled OLS w/ Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors† 
Random Effects   
 
PCSE•2a 
 
PCSE•2b 
   
RE•2a 
 
RE•2b 
 
0 lnGDP  (i) 
 
-1.74*** 
( .628) 
 
-1.46** 
(.718) 
 
-2.01*** 
(.471) 
 
-1.76*** 
(.471) 
International Demand 
Conditions (it) 
2.27*** 
( .221) 
2.33*** 
(.182) 
2.10*** 
(.231) 
2.14*** 
(.234) 
 
 (it) 
 
-1.94 
( 2.27) 
 
-1.91 
(1.89) 
 
-.294 
(2.15) 
 
-1.23 
(2.16) 
 
Dependency Ratio  (it) 
 
11.4 
(13.6) 
 
11.4 
(12.7) 
 
8.36 
(11.3) 
 
4.49 
(11.3) 
 
Exports as a capacity to 
import  (it) 
 
-.009 
( .052) 
 
.002 
(.045) 
 
-.020 
(.060) 
 
-.002 
(.061) 
 
Plurality voting ( it) 
 
_ 
 
.827** 
(.349) 
 
_ 
 
.747** 
(.299) 
 
District  
magnitude (it) 
 
_ 
 
.004 
(.006) 
 
_ 
 
.003 
(.004) 
 
Left cabinet (it) 
 
_ 
 
.502* 
(.297) 
 
_ 
 
.595** 
(.286) 
 
Coordination index (i) 
 
-4.44*** 
(1.39) 
 
-3.44** 
(1.44) 
 
-4.52*** 
(1.60) 
 
-3.23** 
(1.60) 
 
Coordination index 
squared (i) 
 
3.90*** 
(1.29) 
 
3.53*** 
(1.27) 
 
4.36*** 
(1.55) 
 
3.51** 
(1.47) 
N  538  528 538 528 
R2  .27  .27 .21 .24 
χ2  173  286 141 159 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  41  Table 6: Robustness of regression results to the exclusion of specific cases 
 
Excluded 
Cases 
Coefficient on: 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** denotes significant at the .01 level; ** denotes significant at the .05 
level; * denotes significant at the .1 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate*Labour (i) 
 
Coordination index (i), Coordination index 
squared (i) 
 
 
Pooled OLS 
w/PCSE 
 
Random Effects 
 
Pooled OLS w/PCSE
 
Random Effects 
  Base 
model 
Full 
model 
Base 
model 
Full 
model 
Base 
model 
Full 
model 
Base 
model 
Full 
model 
 
Japan 
 
3.60*** 
(1.38) 
 
2.27* 
(1.29) 
 
4.52*** 
(1.74) 
 
2.79* 
(1.67) 
 
-4.49***, 
3.79*** 
(1.39), 
(1.27) 
 
-3.77**, 
3.60*** 
(1.58), 
(1.26) 
 
-4.60***, 
4.31*** 
(1.65), 
(1.60) 
 
-3.60***, 
3.66*** 
(1.69), 
(1.50) 
 
Switzerland 
 
2.55* 
(1.33) 
 
3.13** 
(1.35) 
 
3.36** 
(1.68) 
 
3.00* 
(1.55) 
 
-4.26***, 
3.71*** 
(1.43), 
(1.41) 
 
-3.62**, 
4.10*** 
(1.45), 
(1.37) 
 
-4.25***, 
4.04** 
(1.63), 
(1.60) 
 
-3.10**, 
3.64** 
(1.56), 
(1.45) 
 
Japan & 
Switzerland 
 
3.12** 
(1.57) 
 
2.65* 
(1.40) 
 
4.15** 
(1.87) 
 
2.94* 
(1.75) 
 
-4.31***, 
3.61*** 
(1.43), 
(1.37) 
 
-3.74**, 
4.13*** 
(1.57), 
(1.34) 
 
-4.32**, 
3.99** 
(1.70), 
(1.67) 
 
-3.31**, 
3.70** 
(1.65), 
(1.47) 
 
Denmark 
 
2.42** 
(1.23) 
 
2.34** 
(1.14) 
 
3.34** 
(1.69) 
 
2.49 
(1.60) 
 
-3.60***, 
3.14** 
(1.35), 
(1.25) 
 
-3.11**, 
3.17** 
(1.43), 
(1.26) 
 
-3.92**, 
3.81** 
(1.74), 
(1.67) 
 
-2.99*, 
3.24** 
(1.69), 
(1.55) 
 
Italy 
 
2.86** 
(1.34) 
 
2.06** 
(1.03) 
 
4.01** 
(1.79) 
 
2.45 
(1.59) 
 
-4.57***, 
3.99*** 
(1.37), 
(1.26)  
 
-3.44**, 
3.49*** 
(1.42), 
(1.22) 
 
-4.65***, 
4.48*** 
(1.66), 
(1.63) 
 
-3.23**, 
3.48** 
(1.64), 
(1.52) 
 
New Zealand 
(pre-1988) 
 
3.15** 
(1.25) 
 
2.71** 
(1.15) 
 
3.81** 
(1.57) 
 
2.80* 
(1.51) 
 
-4.35***, 
3.82*** 
(1.35), 
(1.17) 
 
-3.45**, 
3.50*** 
(1.45), 
(1.07) 
 
-4.27***, 
4.17*** 
(1.56), 
(1.50) 
 
-3.16**, 
3.45** 
(1.62), 
(1.48) 
 
UK (pre-
1980) 
 
3.44*** 
(1.27) 
 
3.05** 
(1.22) 
 
4.22*** 
(1.62) 
 
3.21** 
(1.50) 
 
-4.83***, 
4.17*** 
(1.42), 
(1.25) 
 
-3.94***, 
3.90*** 
(1.39), 
(1.21) 
 
-4.86***, 
4.61*** 
(1.62), 
(1.55) 
 
-3.75**, 
3.88*** 
(1.63), 
(1.48) 
 
Denmark, 
Italy, NZ 
(pre-1988) &  
UK (pre-
1980) 
 
2.14** 
(1.02) 
 
1.59* 
(.920) 
 
3.21* 
(1.82) 
 
1.90 
(1.73) 
 
-3.65***, 
3.18*** 
(1.21), 
(1.06) 
 
-3.09**, 
3.09*** 
(1.27), 
(.959)  
 
-3.80**, 
3.76** 
(1.77), 
(1.71) 
 
-2.90*, 
3.13* 
(1.75), 
(1.62)  
 
Table 7: The impact on economic growth of interaction between coordination in 
labour relations and corporate governance in 1971-1984 and 1985-1997 
Pooled OLS w/ Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors† 
Random Effects   
 
-1.97*** 
(.626) 
   
0 lnGDP  (i)  -2.21*** 
( .497) 
 
International Demand 
Conditions (it) 
 
2.50*** 
(.211) 
 
2.33*** 
( .214) 
 
 (it) 
 
-3.58 
(2.39) 
 
-1.70 
(2.42) 
 
Dependency Ratio  (it) 
 
2.37 
(13.9) 
 
5.55 
( 11.4) 
 
Exports as capacity to 
import  (it) 
 
-.006 
(.048) 
 
.004 
( .056) 
 
Coordination in 
Corporate 
Governance (i) 
 
-1.49 
(1.26) 
 
-1.81 
( 1.16) 
 
Coordination in Labour 
Relations (i) 
 
-3.23** 
(1.64) 
 
 
-3.20** 
( 1.56) 
 
Corporate*Labour(i) 
*I[period 1971-1984] 
 
 
3.91*** 
(1.23) 
 
 
4.59*** 
( 1.70) 
 
Corporate*Labour(i) 
*I[period 1985-1997] 
 
 
3.44*** 
(1.21) 
 
4.07** 
(1.69) 
N  538 538 
R2  .31 .25 
 
H0:  β(interaction 1971-1984) = 
   β(interaction 1985-1997) 
 
H0:  β(interaction 1971-1984) = 
   β(interaction 1985-1997) 
 
Test of structural change 
in the effect of interaction 
between coordination in 
corporate governance and 
labour relations 
HA:  β(interaction 1971-1984) ≠ 
   β(interaction 1985-1997) 
HA:  β(interaction 1971-1984) ≠ 
   β(interaction 1985-1997) 
  F-stat. = .443  F-stat. = .505 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; (i) denotes panel-varying but time-invariant explanatory variable; (it) 
denotes panel-varying and time-varying explanatory variable; †  model assumes panel-specific first-order 
autocorrelation; *** denotes significant at the .01 level; ** denotes significant at the .05 level; * denotes 
significant at the .1 level.   
Pr(1.52, υ1=1, υ2=527) = .506  Pr(.910, υ1=1, υ2=527) = .478 
  43  Table 8: Patterns of institutional practices in different types of political economies 
from the 1980s to the early 2000s 
 
      
CMEs  LMEs  MMEs 
 
 1980s  1990s  %  1980s 1990s %  1980s 1990s %  
 
Industrial 
Relations 
           
 
Trade Union Density 
 
49 
 
51 
 
4 
 
34 
 
32 
 
-6 
 
30 
 
32 
 
7 
Bargaining Coverage  76 75 -1  58 48 -17  78 84 8 
Bargaining level  4.2 4.0 -5  1.9 1.8 -5  2.2 2.7 23 
 
Social Protection 
           
 
Employment Protctn 
 
2.6 
 
2.0 
 
-23 
 
0.7 
 
0.7 
 
0 
 
3.6 
 
3.3 
 
-8 
Benefit Entitlements  32.6 35.5 9  24.4 24.1 -1  19 28.4  50 
Social Spending /GDP  21 25 19  15 18 20  16 24 50 
 
Labour Market 
Flexibility 
           
 
Part-Time Emplymt.  
 
16 
 
18 
 
13 
 
16 
 
20 
 
25 
 
8 
 
10 
 
25 
Avg. Hours Worked  1722 1553 -10  1837 1732 -6  1943 1705 -12 
Income Inequality  .24 .26 8  .28 .33 18  .31 .32 1 
 
Firm Structure 
           
 
Average Job Tenure 
 
9.5 
 
9.9 
 
4 
 
7.3 
 
7.3 
 
0 
 
10.7 
 
9.6 
 
-11 
CEO Compensation  8.5 9.8 15  10.3 17.6 29  9.7 15.3  37 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
           
 
Stk Mkt Capitalization 
 
28 
 
69 
 
146 
 
47 
 
79 
 
68 
 
8 
 
37 
 
363 
Debt/Equity Ratio  2.8 1.9 -40  .60 .89 48  2.3 2.2 -4 
 
Earnings and 
Employment 
 
           
Real Earnings  0.75 1.26 68  0.45 0.78 74  1.13 0.93 -18 
Unit Labour Costs  73.4 99.4 44  67.6 97.4 35  54.4 101.8  87 
Total Employment  69 70 1  65 64 -2  57 57 0 
 
Note: The table compares average figures for 1980-89 with average figures for 1990-2002 or latest date 
available.  For variable descriptions and sources, see Appendix 2.  LMEs include: USA, UK, Canada, 
Australia, NZ, Ireland.  CMEs include: Germany, Japan, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, 
  44  Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland.  MMEs include: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, but sample 
sizes vary with data availability.   
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Figure 1: Path diagram of the two-factor model for the six observed variables 
 
 
 
 
Level of Wage 
Coordination 
4 
5  22 
21 
Labour  
Turnover 
6 
23 
Degree of Wage 
Coordination 
Coordination  
in Labour 
Relations  
Coordination  
in Corporate 
Governance  
Dispersion of 
Control 
2 
3 
13 
Size of Stock 
Market 
1 
11 
Shareholder 
Power   
 
 
 
12   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  46   
 
Figure 2: The balance between market and strategic coordination in labour 
relations and corporate governance in OECD countries 
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Note: On each axis, movement away from the origin indicates higher levels of strategic coordination in the 
relevant sphere of the political economy and movement toward the origin indicates higher levels of market 
coordination.
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Figure 3: Potential complementarities across sub-spheres of the political economy 
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Figure 4: The effect on rates of economic growth of the interaction between types of 
coordination in labour relations and corporate governance  
 
  
 
Note: Movement from the origin along the X-axis indicates that coordination in corporate governance 
becomes more strategic.  Predicted values denoted by solid dark lines, 90% confidence intervals denoted 
by dashed lines; simulation based on model RE•1a 
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Figure 5: The estimated relationship between coordination and rates of economic 
growth 
 
Note: Predicted values are denoted by solid dark lines, 90% confidence intervals denoted by 
dashed lines; simulation based on model RE•2a 
 
 
 
 
  50  Figure 6: Changes in inequality in disposable income in liberal and
 coordinated market economies, 1980-1995
200
220
240
260
280
300
320
340
1980 1985 1990 1995
Years
G
i
n
i
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
f
o
r
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
I
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
LMEs
CMEs
 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study. 
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  51  Appendix 1: Variable Descriptions for the Growth Regressions 
 
     
variable  definition  source 
Yit  Growth rate of real GDP 
per capita (constant prices: 
chain series) 
Penn World Table 6.1 
 
lnGDPi 
Log GDP per capita in 1971 
calculated using real GDP 
per capita (constant prices: 
chain series) 
Penn World Table 6.1 
 
Intit 
Average rate of growth for 
the entire sample in each 
year weighted by a 
country's trade openness 
openness: OECD Statistical Compendium 
2006, vol.1 
it  Rate of growth of inflation 
(as measured by the CPI) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
 
 
Expit 
Percentage change in 
exports as a capacity to 
import (constant LCU) 
weighted by trade 
openness. Exports as a 
capacity to import equals 
the current price value of 
exports of goods and 
services deflated by the 
import price index. 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
 
Dit 
Percentage change in the 
dependency ratio (number 
of individuals under 15 and 
older than 65 as a 
percentage of working age 
population) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
PLUit 
1 if majority of 
representatives in lower 
house are elected by 
plurality voting, 0 
otherwise 
Database of Political Institutions, World Bank 
Institute, http://www.worldbank.org/wbi 
MAGit  Average district magnitude 
in the lower chamber 
Database of Political Institutions 
 
Leftcabit 
Left party cabinet portfolios 
as proportion of total 
cabinet portfolios 
Duane Swank's Comparative Parties Data Set 
(http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/Swank.htm
) 
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Variable Description  Source 
   
Trade Union Density  Union membership as percent of 
labour force: 1980-89 vs 1990-
2002. 
Comparative Welfare States Data 
Set 2004, OECD Employment 
Outlook  1997, European 
Industrial Relations Observatory 
On-line  
OECD  Employment Outlook 
1994, 1997, European Industrial 
Relations Observatory On-line 
Bargaining  Coverage  Percent of labour force covered 
by collective bargaining: 1980, 
1985 vs 1990, 1994, 2000, 2001, 
2002 
Bargaining Level  Degree of centralization in wage 
bargaining: 1980-89 vs 1990-
2000 
Comparative Welfare States Data 
Set 2004, OECD Employment 
Outlook  1997, European 
Industrial Relations Observatory 
On-line 
Employment  Protection  Strictness of legislation for 
regular and temporary contracts: 
late 1980s v late 1990s 
OECD  Employment Outlook 
1997 
Benefit  Entitlements  Gross replacement rate for 
unemployment benefit averaged 
over earning levels and family 
situations: 1981,83,85,87,89 v 
1991, 93,95,97,99 
OECD Benefits and Wages 
Indicators 2002. 
OECD Factbook 2007  Social Spending/GDP  Public  social expenditure as a 
percent of GDP: 1980 v 2003 
OECD  Labour Force Statistics 
2003. 
Part-Time Employment  Percent of labour force employed 
less than 30 hours per week in 
their main job: 1980-89 v 1990-
2002 
OECD Factbook 2007.  Average  Hours  Worked  Hours per year worked per 
person in employment: 1980 v 
2005 
Income  Inequality  Gini Coefficient for disposable 
income: year closest to 1980 v 
most recent available year 
Luxembourg Income Data Study 
Key Figures. 
Average  Job  Tenure  Average number of years 
employed with same firm: 1980, 
85, 89 v 1990, 91, 95 
OECD,  Employment Outlook 
1993, 1997. 
CEO Compensation  Ratio of total CEO compensation 
and benefits to that of 
manufacturing operatives: 1984 v 
1996 
Abowd, John M. And David S. 
Kaplan,‘Executive 
Compensation, Six Questions that 
Need Answering.’ National 
Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper No. 7124.  May 
1999. 
Stock Market Capitalization  Ratio  of  stock  market 
capitalization to GDP: 1980-89 v 
1990-2001 
World Bank Online Database. 
Debt/Equity Ratio  Ratio of debt to equity for non-
financial enterprises: 1980/85 v 
1992/3 
OECD  Economies at a Glance: 
Structural Indicators 1996. 
  53  Real Earnings  Year  to  year percent change in 
real hourly earnings in 
manufacturing: 1980-89 v 1990-
2000 
OECD Historical Statistics 2001. 
Unit Labour Costs  Wages,  salaries  employer 
contributions per unit of output: 
1980-89 v 1990-2000 
OECD STAN Indicators 
database. 
OECD Historical Statistics 2001.  Total  Employment  Total employment as percent of 
population aged 15 to 64: 1980-
89 v 1990-2000. 
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